-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 Xen Security Advisory CVE-2022-42324 / XSA-420 version 2 Oxenstored 32->31 bit integer truncation issues UPDATES IN VERSION 2 ==================== Public release. ISSUE DESCRIPTION ================= Integers in Ocaml are 63 or 31 bits of signed precision. The Ocaml Xenbus library takes a C uint32_t out of the ring and casts it directly to an Ocaml integer. In 64-bit Ocaml builds this is fine, but in 32-bit builds, it truncates off the most significant bit, and then creates unsigned/signed confusion in the remainder. This in turn can feed a negative value into logic not expecting a negative value, resulting in unexpected exceptions being thrown. The unexpected exception is not handled suitably, creating a busy-loop trying (and failing) to take the bad packet out of the xenstore ring. IMPACT ====== A malicious or buggy guest can write a packet into the xenstore ring which causes 32-bit builds of oxenstored to busy loop. VULNERABLE SYSTEMS ================== All versions of Xen are affected. Systems running a 32-bit build of oxenstored are affected. Systems running a 64-bit build of oxenstored, or systems running (C) xenstored are not affected. MITIGATION ========== Running xenstored instead of oxenstored will avoid the vulnerability. CREDITS ======= This issue was discovered by Jürgen Groß of SUSE. RESOLUTION ========== Applying the appropriate attached patch resolves this issue. Note that patches for released versions are generally prepared to apply to the stable branches, and may not apply cleanly to the most recent release tarball. Downstreams are encouraged to update to the tip of the stable branch before applying these patches. xsa420.patch xen-unstable - Xen 4.13.x $ sha256sum xsa420* 565b332d325fd0fdeb5fee890c0cd9b53c4478c46c6b7ec7b24fd3444d2dc812 xsa420.meta bfa83ca1e78ef81f93c3d94cb1522d1cffed8b9989c5639e8ec663fad0a71027 xsa420.patch $ DEPLOYMENT DURING EMBARGO ========================= Deployment of the patches and/or mitigations described above (or others which are substantially similar) is permitted during the embargo, even on public-facing systems with untrusted guest users and administrators. But: Distribution of updated software is prohibited (except to other members of the predisclosure list). Predisclosure list members who wish to deploy significantly different patches and/or mitigations, please contact the Xen Project Security Team. (Note: this during-embargo deployment notice is retained in post-embargo publicly released Xen Project advisories, even though it is then no longer applicable. This is to enable the community to have oversight of the Xen Project Security Team's decisionmaking.) For more information about permissible uses of embargoed information, consult the Xen Project community's agreed Security Policy: http://www.xenproject.org/security-policy.html -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQFABAEBCAAqFiEEI+MiLBRfRHX6gGCng/4UyVfoK9kFAmNg+68MHHBncEB4ZW4u b3JnAAoJEIP+FMlX6CvZWJ8H/33T8Ub00BrIWdWSvajjRA4oLamGKRg5uJoI5peJ cpgKB7iFcoOZcM+G2YfYjm8W2ckoEHXQkJ7fJEbAW0rHc8+WyWl2ulklZSpyi9RX B6jloIo+5pFoenShirPrJNyfbCmgJduRiUcIzPMRg6vgTmS1RO1W2x3/A6haxez5 LOJCm8dhUBbrp83KH7MgVBlUXIlVQ1irKBmCps11lFG7LaMWjLtScPI4qCpFbMf/ Cmd91Jw6EpzfOWcqohbRabqXXrPZJqSe+EwqrEJsVkkEIK2y2e/kUWcy/9shr9a2 YtudokkROE+bJGbpM9bbucCu/Rnwqj20fDIztR0soCtPbOM= =QFv9 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----