Information

Files

Advisory

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA256

            Xen Security Advisory CVE-2020-29040 / XSA-355
                              version 3

                 stack corruption from XSA-346 change

UPDATES IN VERSION 3
====================

CVE assigned.

ISSUE DESCRIPTION
=================

One of the two changes for XSA-346 introduced an on-stack array.  The
check for guarding against overrunning this array was off by one,
allowing for corruption of the first stack slot immediately following
this array.

IMPACT
======

A malicious or buggy HVM or PVH guest can cause Xen to crash, resulting
in a Denial of Service (DoS) to the entire host.  Privilege escalation
as well as information leaks cannot be excluded.

VULNERABLE SYSTEMS
==================

All Xen versions which have the patches for XSA-346 applied are
vulnerable.

Only x86 HVM and PVH guests can leverage the vulnerability.  Arm guests
and x86 PV guests cannot leverage the vulnerability.

Only x86 HVM and PVH guests which have physical devices passed through
to them can leverage the vulnerability.

MITIGATION
==========

Not passing through physical devices to untrusted guests will avoid
the vulnerability.

CREDITS
=======

This issue was discovered by Jan Beulich of SUSE.

RESOLUTION
==========

Applying the attached patch resolves this issue.

Note that patches for released versions are generally prepared to
apply to the stable branches, and may not apply cleanly to the most
recent release tarball.  Downstreams are encouraged to update to the
tip of the stable branch before applying these patches.

xsa355.patch           xen-unstable - Xen 4.10.x

$ sha256sum xsa355*
a93bfc376897e7cffd095d395f1a66476adb9503d7d80a59b7861e64c2675323  xsa355.meta
dae633c11cf2eff3e304737265e18ab09213e8e4640458080a944ae7a40819a4  xsa355.patch
$

NOTE CONCERNING SHORT EMBARGO
=============================

This issue is likely to be re-discovered as the changes for XSA-346
are deployed more widely, since the issue is also triggerable without
any malice or bugginess.

DEPLOYMENT DURING EMBARGO
=========================

Deployment of the patches and/or mitigations described above (or
others which are substantially similar) is permitted during the
embargo, even on public-facing systems with untrusted guest users and
administrators.

But: Distribution of updated software is prohibited (except to other
members of the predisclosure list).

Predisclosure list members who wish to deploy significantly different
patches and/or mitigations, please contact the Xen Project Security
Team.

(Note: this during-embargo deployment notice is retained in
post-embargo publicly released Xen Project advisories, even though it
is then no longer applicable.  This is to enable the community to have
oversight of the Xen Project Security Team's decisionmaking.)

For more information about permissible uses of embargoed information,
consult the Xen Project community's agreed Security Policy:
  http://www.xenproject.org/security-policy.html
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----

iQFABAEBCAAqFiEEI+MiLBRfRHX6gGCng/4UyVfoK9kFAmAHB6UMHHBncEB4ZW4u
b3JnAAoJEIP+FMlX6CvZpMAH/AwWuyJ0tQS95kJmfCSe9gxFkIZwnoOlxAIF1fQ8
0W7OXmgrr9giz3lVR6Kjannq3HextHuLoVttg3soJ6pCqPBOH84/k0vyHEb9ChBF
ypkvH0iG1wnpVo+DdYOnY7OnaBHrPsB0E83WfKohP05e+Ymcroq09vKw02fR6B+z
+D3uNzbNi1kZz1DcTZFsCAmHJsc3zS+D8jyEwOFQwlVckugJ+zDuylKtSDau56CN
WGG3nkoDldWm1687ui4stnal8WIBP6sMgErwnv9hpzfL5glc/m0PSELQ8hZgNmAX
KMoWvdjPenwPQEhrii92P15DbXGz6uktIZFrKRgCUx2u5ss=
=1hd2
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----